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PUTTING BOOMERS TO PASTURE:
DOES THE 2010 MIPPA LEGISLATION
REINFORCE THE NURSING HOME
BIAS?
ROBERT S. BLOINK*
I. Introduction and Roadmap
Unfunded health related costs are the greatest financial
uncertainty facing the baby boom generation as they enter
retirement years. The vast majority of those costs will relate to
home and institutional based health care services provided in
the last months of their lives.1 When presented with the choice
of receiving such end-of-life care in a home based setting versus
an institutionalized setting, almost every senior will opt for
home based care.2 Prior to 2010, the Medigap at-home recovery
benefit covered expenditures incurred in connection with in-

* Professor Robert Bloink started out his career with the IRS’s Office of
Chief Counsel. Before leaving the IRS for private practice, Mr. Bloink
established himself internally as one of the leading government experts on
the taxation of structured finance and insurance products.
Mr. Bloink’s private practice involved wealth transfer and succession
planning for high net worth families. Over the past decade, Mr. Bloink has
worked with producers to place over $1.4 billion in structured finance
solutions, and more than $1.0 billion of death benefits.
In addition to his role as senior editor for National Underwriters, Mr. Bloink
has served as an adjunct law professor at numerous U.S. law schools. Most
recently Mr. Bloink is serving as a Visiting Assistant Professor of Tax Law at
the University of South Dakota Law School.
1. Samuel Marshall et al., The Risk of Out-of-Pocket Health Care
Expenditure at End of Life 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No.
16170,
2010),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16170.pdf?new_window=1; see also Lisa R.
Shugarman et al., Differences in Medicare Expenditures During the Last 3
Years of Life, 19(2) J. GEN. INTERNAL MED., 127, 127-35 (2004).
2. Amanda J. Lehning & Michael J. Austin, Long-Term Care in the
United States: Policy Themes and Promising Practices, 53 J. GERONTOLOGICAL
SOC. WORK 43, 50 (2009).
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home skilled medical care covered by a Medicare policy,3 such
as personal care services that many seniors require in order to
avoid a nursing home stay. The at-home recovery benefit was
eliminated by the Medicare Improvements for Patients and
Providers Act (“MIPPA”) in 2010.4 The Supreme Court took a
decidedly different approach regarding access to home based
health care options for this Medicaid-eligible senior population
in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring.5 The Olmstead decision
acknowledged the long standing bias toward providing end-oflife health care services in an institutionalized setting,
typically a nursing home, and, in an effort to have more of
these Medicaid services provided in-home, required that “public
entit[ies] . . . administer . . . programs . . . in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
individuals with disabilities.”6 Through this “integrated care”
mandate, the Supreme Court recognized that the unjustified
segregation of poor seniors in institutions was discrimination
and that home and community based services (“HCBS”) care
options must be provided where appropriate and reasonable in
light of the patient’s needs.7 However, it is the engrained
nursing home bias that non-Medicaid-eligible middle class
boomers are likely to fall victim to, despite their stated
intentions to the contrary.
Because administering end-of-life care in a nursing home
setting has become the default in the United States, today
current retirees who fail to make affirmative decisions about
how and where their end-of-life care will be administered will
have little choice but to receive long-term care in an
3. While all seniors aged 65 and over are eligible for Medicare, only
those with very limited financial resources qualify for Medicaid coverage.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
MEDICARE AND OTHER HEALTH BENEFITS: YOUR GUIDE TO WHO PAYS FIRST 8
(2011), available at http://www.medicare.gov/publications/pubs/pdf/02179.pdf.
Though the asset threshold for Medicaid qualification varies across states, in
most states, only those with assets valued at under $2,000 will qualify.
Mariacristina De Nardi et al., Medicaid and the Elderly, 36 ECON. PERSP., 17,
20 (2012).
4. Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-275, 122 Stat. 2494 (2008).
5. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
6. Id. at 592 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2012)).
7. See id. at 597.
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institutional setting. Failure to affirmatively engage in
planning for end-of-life care choices is often simply a byproduct
of limited information and even less professional guidance
available regarding such decisions. This article seeks to explore
what lessons can be learned from how Medicaid end-of-life
health care services are provided to the poor post-Olmstead,
and how these lessons can be applied to middle class and upper
middle class boomers. The article equally seeks to address how
such lessons can be integrated into a meaningful dialogue with
retiring boomers in a fashion that encourages discussion and
decisions regarding end-of-life health care, as opposed to
leaving such tough calls for surviving adult children.
To this end, Part II of this article begins by examining the
hurdles seniors face in accessing HCBS after the defunding of
the Medigap at-home recovery option in 2010, taking into
account the difficulties involved in planning for long-term care
that are caused by significant cost variances depending on the
community in which the care is provided.8 This section further
explores the impact of informal care provided by family
members on the cost and effectiveness of long-term care
performed in the home.
Part III provides a summary of the historical background
of long-term care in the United States and explores the genesis
and perpetuation of the bias toward providing end-of-life care
in an institutional setting, despite the high costs of nursing
home care, leading up to the integrated care mandate handed
down by the Supreme Court in Olmstead.9 In Part IV, the
varying degrees to which states have implemented the
Olmstead mandate are examined to provide an empirical
analysis of the cost-savings and reduction in nursing home
admission rates that can be realized through effective and
widespread implementation of HCBS programs.10 Spending on
long-term care in states with underdeveloped HCBS programs
is compared to expenditures in states offering comprehensive
programs to determine the overall effect of increasing access to
HCBS.

8. See discussion infra Part II.
9. See discussion infra Part III.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
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Part V identifies the planning gap that exists because of
the reluctance of both advisors and clients to discuss end-of-life
care.11 This section recognizes the often-conflicting motivations
of financial advisors and attorneys, as well as the disinclination
of clients toward discussing the end of their lives, both of which
can lead to a joint failure to develop effective strategies for
funding end-of-life care.
Part VI aims to encourage advisors and clients to ignite
the dialogue on end-of-life planning.12 It discusses the possible
imposition of filial responsibility upon adult children for the
long-term care expenses of their elderly parents and suggests
that selective enforcement of filial support statutes could
promote financial preparedness among baby boomer retirees.
This section also raises the notion that fiduciary liability may
be a motivating force that could persuade advisors to initiate
the planning dialogue. With both sides motivated to engage in
fulsome planning for end-of-life choices, this article
hypothesizes that this planning dialogue can be transformed
from one that advisors avoid and clients recoil from into a
conversation that imparts a message of empowerment and
hope among seniors who can develop the tools necessary to
control the course of their own end-of-life care.
II. Access to HCBS
The longstanding bias toward providing end-of-life health
care in an institutional setting has been perpetuated by the
government’s elimination of the at-home recovery coverage
relied upon by many seniors using HCBS for skilled medical
care. Prior to the 2010 amendments to Medicare, retirees were
provided with a wider range of coverage options and were thus
able to exercise a greater degree of control over whether they
received cost-effective HCBS recovery care versus substantially
more expensive institutionalized rehabilitative care after a
hospitalization.13 Medigap policies, which are federally
11. See discussion infra Part V.
12. See discussion infra Part VI.
13. Health Reform Mandates Changes for Medigap Policies, CENTER. FOR
MEDICARE ADVOC., INC., http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/2011/01/07/healthreform-mandates-changes-for-medigap-policies/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2012);
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standardized insurance policies purchased through private
insurance companies to supplement traditional Medicare
policies, provided an optional at-home recovery benefit prior to
2010.14 In 2010, the MIPPA revised the federal standards to
eliminate the at-home recovery coverage provided by certain
Medigap policies, dramatically limiting the availability of
HCBS for many seniors.15 Because these Medigap policies are
federally standardized, they provide only the medical coverage
mandated by the federal rules even though the policies are
purchased from private insurance companies.16 This means
that non-indigent seniors bear the burden of payment for
expenses not specifically mandated by these one-size-fits-all
policies.
Several of these Medigap policies were required to provide
at-home recovery coverage prior to 2010 as an optional method
for funding the personal care services that are often required to
assist seniors with activities of daily living (“ADLs”)17 while
they receive in-home medical care funded by traditional
Medicare policies.18 While Medigap and, in certain cases,
traditional Medicare policies, continue to cover much of the inhome medical care required by seniors, assistance with
performing ADLs is often essential to the ability of elderly
Genworth 2012 Cost of Care Survey, GENWORTH FIN., INC. (Mar. 13, 2012),
http://www.genworth.com/content/non_navigable/corporate/about_genworth/i
ndustry_expertise/cost_of_care.html [hereinafter Genworth 2012 Survey]. The
Genworth 2012 survey provides an interactive tool that allows for effective
comparison between the cost of HCBS care and institutionalized care in any
given state. For example, in New York State the cost of a home health aide is
approximately $50,336 annually, while the annual cost for a private nursing
home room is estimated to be $123,005.
14. Health Reform Mandates Changes for Medigap Policies, CTR. FOR
MEDICARE
ADVOCACY,
INC.,
http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/2011/01/07/health-reform-mandateschanges-for-medigap-policies/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. ADLs are those daily activities that are considered critical to
independent living, and include activities such as “bathing, dressing, eating .
. . and toileting.” Kenneth E. Covinsky et al., Loss of Independence in
Activities of Daily Living in Older Adults Hospitalized with Medical Illnesses:
Increased Vulnerability with Age, 51 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC’Y 451, 451 (2003).
18. See Health Reform Mandates Changes for Medigap Policies, supra
note 14.
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patients to function independently in their homes.19
Seniors who are admitted into a nursing home, of course,
receive assistance with ADLs because they are no longer living
independently. Institutional care, by its nature, provides a
level of supervision with ADLs that many seniors require.
Since the MIPPA defunded coverage for personal care services
for patients who are no longer able to perform ADLs
independently, supervised nursing home living is often the only
available option. Because the ability of seniors to perform
ADLs is so critical,20 the in-home skilled medical care covered
by Medicare policies is often worth little for those who are
unable to perform ADLs without assistance.
Therefore, access to HCBS is limited because of the gaps in
coverage that exist for elderly patients relying on government
health insurance programs to pay for care.21 While Medicare
recipients are permitted to choose where their posthospitalization medical care will take place, Medicare and
Medigap policies no longer cover non-medical support from
health aides that promote autonomy among seniors by
19. Covinsky et al., supra note 17, at 452.
20. See Covinsky et al., supra note 17.
21. Terence Ng et al., Medicare and Medicaid in Long-Term Care, 29
HEALTH AFF. 22, 23-24 (2010). Traditional Medicare policies provide limited
coverage for skilled care or therapy services in the home following a
hospitalization. While all seniors over age sixty-five qualify for Medicare
coverage, long-term care benefits are limited because they are only available
for a specified period of time (typically, full coverage lasts only twenty days,
with partial coverage beginning on day twenty-one). Richard L. Kaplan,
Retirement Planning’s Greatest Gap: Funding Long-Term Care, 11 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 407, 420 (2007). Medicaid coverage of long-term care services,
on the other hand, is limited to those “medically needy” patients who have
spent-down their assets to state mandated levels (typically around $2,000).
See Sudipto Banerjee, Effects of Nursing Home Stays on Household Portfolios,
EBRI
ISSUE
BRIEF,
June
2012,
at
1,
available
at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_06-2012_No372_NrsHmStys.pdf.
While states are permitted to provide more generous HCBS benefits, few
states have implemented comprehensive and fully functional HCBS programs
to supplement nursing home benefits. Once a patient qualifies for Medicaid
coverage, however, there is no time limit to the length of time he or she can
claim benefits. Medicaid pays for institutional services provided in a nursing
home, in-home skilled medical care and the personal care services attendant
to in-home medical coverage for those medically needy seniors who qualify for
coverage.
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providing the in-home personal assistance that is usually
required during a post-hospitalization recovery period.22
Medicaid programs will pay for long-term care in an institution
or in the home, and will also pay for the required personal care
services for those seniors who require assistance with ADLs,
but only for the medically needy who are able to qualify for
coverage.23 This MIPPA defunding has effectively forced many
seniors to opt for recovery in nursing homes because they
require non-medical assistance in order to safely live
unsupervised while using HCBS options, and such assistance is
no longer covered under any Medicare or Medigap policy.24
Increased reliance on private funds for HCBS financing
has generated a dilemma for those retirement-age seniors who
attempt to plan for unfunded post-retirement medical
expenses. Although financing the high cost of long-term care
presents a challenge in any state, as expenditures for HCBS
have grown by 235% in the last twenty years,25 HCBS and
nursing home cost variance among states is often significant.
For example, when actuarial models developed by financial
professionals are used to compare projected post-retirement
medical expenses for a sixty-five-year-old couple living in New
Jersey to the projected costs for a similarly-situated couple
living in Hawaii, the variance is 33.7 percent.26 Such large cost
variances between states complicate effective planning for
financing post-retirement medical expenses, especially
considering the mobility of retirees today.
The complications inherent in projecting post-retirement
medical expenses often result in seniors who are financially
unprepared to fund professional HCBS. Approximately eighty
22. Health Reform Mandates Changes for Medigap Policies, supra note
14.
23. Ng et al., supra note 21, at 23-24.
24. Health Reform Mandates Changes for Medigap Policies, supra note
14.
25. THOMAS DAVIDOFF, LONG-TERM CARE HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 2
(2012).
26. Dan McGrath, States Ranking When It Comes to Healthcare Costs in
Retirement,
HEALTHVIEW
SERVICES
(June
9,
2012),
http://www.hvsfinancial.com/2012/06/states-ranking-when-it-comes-tohealthcare-costs-in-retirement.
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percent of seniors receiving HCBS rely upon unpaid family
members to provide some HCBS, whether on a full time or
sporadic basis, in order to avoid institutionalization.27 In fact, a
2009 study found that only one in four seniors who receive care
at home rely upon any form of paid care.28 Though adult
children may be able to provide a portion of the care required
by their elderly parents, the limitations inherent to provision of
this informal care often mean that admission to a nursing
home eventually becomes the norm.29
Though informal care provided by adult children and other
family members does not per se create a direct financial burden
upon seniors or their families, the caregivers almost always
experience lost opportunity costs, such as lost wages or time
spent with children or spouses, when they must allocate a
portion of their time to providing care.30 Because forty-two
percent of informal care is provided by adult children, rather
than the senior’s elderly spouse,31 the work, familial, and social
commitments of these younger caregivers limit the level of care
that can be provided. Unsurprisingly, studies have found that
adult children who experience greater lost opportunity costs
are much less likely to be able to provide sufficient levels of
care to their elderly parents over the long term.32 From a policy
perspective, the inherent limitations on adult children who
provide informal long-term care services for their elderly
parents make development of effective professional care

27. Sidney D. Watson, From Almshouses to Nursing Homes and
Community Care: Lessons from Medicaid's History, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 937,
962 (2010) (citing Boon or Bane? Examining the Value of Long-Term Care
Insurance: Hearing on Role of Private Insurance in Long-Term Care Before S.
Spec. Comm. On Aging, 111th Cong. 9 (2009) (testimony of Diane Rowland,
Sc.D., Executive Vice President, Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation),
available at http://aging.senate.gov/publications/632009.pdf.
28. Brenda Spillman, Financial Preparedness for Long-Term Care Needs
in Old Age, in CONSUMER KNOWLEDGE AND FINANCIAL DECISIONS: LIFESPAN
PERSPECTIVES 239, 241 (Douglas J. Lamdin ed., 2012).
29. See Jacey J. Vaughan & Nina M. Silverstein, Leaving Home Care:
Decision Making, Risk Scenarios & Services Gaps in the Home Care System,
GERONTOLOGY INST. PUBLICATIONS, Dec. 2011, at 1, 18.
30. David Byrne et al., Formal Home Health Care, Informal Care, and
Family Decision Making, 50 INT’L ECON. REV. 1205, 1209 (2009).
31. Id. at 1218.
32. Id. at 1238-39.
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services the only responsible method of providing safe and
effective in-home care. Developing methods for funding this
professional care is therefore necessary to allow seniors to
access comprehensive in-home care services.
If funding methods are not developed so as to allow seniors
access to professional in-home care, institutionalization will
continue to be the only feasible option for many retirees. To
illustrate further, eighty-one percent of respondents in a
University of Massachusetts survey found that a lack of
around-the-clock supervision was the largest gap in the HCBS
system, while seventy percent found that a lack of informal
support was one of the most common triggers to nursing home
admission.33 When informal familial caregivers become unable
to provide the care necessary to maintain elderly family
members in their own homes and professional in-home care
cannot be financed, nursing home admission becomes the
default solution.34
Once a senior citizen is admitted into a nursing home, the
likelihood that he or she will return home and receive homebased care becomes remote.35 Nursing home care becomes the
default modality for admitted seniors, largely because the
dilemma of how to pay for institutionally-based care typically
disappears very quickly.36 Because the average annual cost for
a nursing home in the United States is approximately $75,555
per year,37 most seniors admitted to nursing homes quickly
spend-down their assets and qualify for Medicaid’s need-based
coverage.38 In contrast, the challenge of how to pay for homebased care remains.
The defunding of HCBS has increased the likelihood that
admission to a nursing home will become the solution for
seniors who are unable to live independently because, as assets
are quickly spent-down, the government steps in with Medicaid
33. Vaughan & Silverstein, supra note 29, at 6.
34. See id. at 18.
35. Alison Patrucco Barnes, Beyond Guardianship Reform: A
Reevaluation of Autonomy and Beneficence for a System of Principled
Decision-Making in Long-Term Care, 41 EMORY L.J. 633, 647 n.44 (1992).
36. See Banerjee, supra note 21, at 4.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 14.
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coverage to fund this end-of-life care expense.39 This engrained
response to end-of-life health care perpetuates the bias toward
administering care in an institutional setting instead of using
HCBS where appropriate.
III. Historical Perspective
For most of the twentieth century, the social bias toward
providing end-of-life care in institutional settings perpetuated
the entrenchment of nursing homes in the United States. The
bias toward nursing home care began in the nineteenth
century, when almshouses were created to house poor patients
who suffered from diseases for which there was no known
cure.40 Though patients were not always treated for their
ailments, the almshouse served as a place to isolate them from
the larger community.41
After the Great Depression, the government developed the
federal Old-Age Assistance (OAA) program that discouraged
the use of almshouses by providing federal funding for state
programs focused on long-term care, but only if the recipient
patients were not currently “inmates” in an almshouse.42 This
incentivized states to develop “rest homes” and “convalescent
homes” to replace the almshouses as the primary form of
institutional care.43
The OAA also created a disincentive to in-home care
provided informally by a patient’s family members, because the
provision of federal funding removed the stigma previously
attached to institutional care in an almshouse. The negative
connotations that accompanied the idea of an almshouse as a
“poorhouse,” where the patients often suffered from diseases
that were perceived to be incurable, such as alcoholism and
mental infirmity, encouraged many families to avoid
institutionalizing their elderly relatives to avoid being
associated with these stigmatisms.44 Nursing homes, however,
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Watson, supra note 27, at 940-41.
Id.
Id. at 943.
Id. at 944.
See generally id. at 940 (affirming that the “home atmosphere was
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were federally funded and able to offer real treatment,
removing many of the negative associations that families of
elderly patients had associated with institutional care prior to
their development.45
After Congress amended the Social Security Act in the
1950s, federal and state spending on nursing homes increased
to nearly $450 million annually.46 The Kerr-Mills Act, which
was the predecessor to Medicaid,47 was enacted in the 1960s
and, though it was technically permitted to fund both nursing
home care and HCBS, it offered direct reimbursement to
nursing homes instead of to individual recipients, which
encouraged the widespread growth of private sector for-profit
nursing homes that had the resources to aggressively seek out
government reimbursement.48
As the number of private sector nursing facilities
expanded, institutional care became even more engrained in
the medical industry by providing an easy solution for hospitals
caring for seniors who required personal care services more
than skilled medical assistance.49 Because nursing homes had
become so prevalent in the industry, medical professionals
could release patients into nursing homes with the assurance
that their care would continue to be funded by the
government.50
Under Medicaid, which succeeded Kerr-Mills as the
primary conduit for funding medical care for the poor, all states
developed long-term care programs to assist the “medically
needy,” causing Medicaid spending on nursing home care to
increase from approximately $800 million to $4.2 billion in the

viewed as the ideal place to be cared for . . . [and] [p]overty, disability, and
illness were viewed as moral failings”).
45. Id. at 960.
46. Id. at 945 (citing ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE
MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 34 (Transaction Publishers
2d ed. 2003) (1974)).
47. Laura D. Hermer, Federal/State Tensions in Fulfilling Medicaid’s
Purpose, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 615, 618 (2012).
48. Id. at 951.
49. See DAVID BARTON SMITH, REINVENTING CARE: ASSISTED LIVING IN
NEW YORK CITY 50-51 (2003).
50. See id at 51.
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1960s.51 Encouraged by Medicaid’s requirement that aid
recipients be “medically needy,” the long-term care market
became saturated with for-profit nursing homes that fueled the
rapidly increasing cost of providing institutional care because
once a patient’s assets were spent down to the poverty level,
Medicaid stepped in to fund nursing home payments
indefinitely.52 Today, almost two-thirds of nursing homes are
operated privately as for-profit entities53—and these entities
have an incentive to cause their patients to spend-down assets
quickly because, once a patient has exhausted his or her
personal resources, there is often little choice but to remain in
the nursing home permanently.
The Supreme Court recognized this decades old funding
and societal bias toward nursing home care in its Olmstead
decision.54 In Olmstead, the plaintiffs were two mentally
disabled women who had been receiving care in an institutional
setting.55 Their physicians had found that they could receive
appropriate care in a home-based setting, but the women
remained institutionalized despite their requests to be
transferred into HCBS programs.56 They filed suit alleging that
the state’s failure to transfer them into the community-based
program, despite the physician’s finding that such care was
appropriate, was discrimination under the Americans with
Disabilities Act.57
The Court agreed that de facto institutionalization can
constitute discrimination, holding that:
[S]tates are required to provide communitybased treatment for persons with mental
51. Id. at 49.
52. Nathalie D. Martin & Elizabeth Rourke, Les Jeux Ne Sont Pas Faits:
The Right to Dignified Long-Term Care in the Face of Industry-Wide
Financial Failure, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 149 (2000).
53. David G. Stevenson & David C. Grabowski, Private Equity
Investment and Nursing Home Care: Is it a Big Deal?, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1399,
1399
(2008),
available
at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/27/5/1399.full.html.
54. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
55. Id. at 593.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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disabilities
when the State’s
treatment
professionals determine that such placement is
appropriate, the affected persons do not oppose
such treatment, and the placement can be
reasonably accommodated, taking into account
the resources available to the State and the
needs of others with mental disabilities.58
In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted the importance of
avoiding the negative effects that come from isolating an
individual from the community and diminishing his or her
contact with family and friends.59
Through this decision, the Supreme Court sought to
encourage investment in HCBS by recognizing that
professionally administered HCBS can provide a level of care
comparable to that found in nursing homes without the
negative side effects faced by the institutionalized elderly.
Through increased use of HCBS, end-of-life care can be
provided while maintaining the economic and social
independence of the patient and without isolating the elderly
from their families and communities.60
Because many elderly nursing home residents primarily
require personal care services, as opposed to more expensive
skilled medical care, HCBS can help reduce the rate at which
assets are spent-down and, therefore, avoid trapping seniors in
nursing homes. The integrated care mandate handed down
through the Olmstead decision represented the first step away
from the nursing home bias perpetuated throughout the
twentieth century. Olmstead recognized that simply because
nursing homes are an easy option does not mean that they
represent the most effective or cost-efficient route to providing
end-of-life care.61

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 607.
Id. at 601.
Id. at 600-01.
See id.
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IV. Empirical Analysis of Impact of Greater Access to HCBS
In the thirteen years since the Supreme Court decided
Olmstead, states have had ample opportunity to implement
appropriate HCBS programs to comply with the Court’s
integrated care mandate. However, states have implemented
HCBS programs to increase integration of patients within their
communities at varying paces.62 This tiered approach to
implementing HCBS programs provides a unique opportunity
to evaluate and compare the effectiveness of HCBS programs
in their varying stages of development. By comparing empirical
data from states with newly-formed or nonexistent HCBS
programs with data from states maintaining fully functional
HCBS programs, it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of
HCBS in reducing admission rates to institutions, as well as
determining dollars spent on this institutionalized care.
Empirical studies have shown that spending on long-term
care initially increases when states aggressively seek to fulfill
the Olmstead integrated care mandate, which can be expected
because these states are establishing new programs and adding
services that were previously unavailable.63 In states where
HCBS programs were in the development phases, overall state
spending on long-term care increased by approximately
24.2%.64
This spending increase is logical because, as HCBS become
more widely accessible, seniors who had previously relied upon
the unpaid services of their adult children will begin to
supplant these services with professional home-based care
providers as they become available. Further, the increase in
spending is only temporary, as studies have shown that where
states have spent diligently to implement the Olmstead
integrated care mandate, the cost of long-term care actually
declines by about 7.9% once HCBS programs are fully

62. See, e.g., Elizabeth P. Allen, The ACA’s Medicaid HCBS Long-Term
Care-Reforms: Potential Positive Impact on the Fiscal Health of the States,
243 ELDER L. ADVISORY 1 (2011).
63. Stephen H. Kaye et al., Do Noninstitutional Long-Term Care
Services Reduce Medicaid Spending?, 28 HEALTH AFF. 262, 265 (2009).
64. Id.
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established.65
Widespread availability of HCBS programs also decreases
overall spending on nursing homes specifically, suggesting that
seniors who are presented with the choice between
institutional care and HCBS are more likely to choose HCBS
and remain in their homes.66 In recent years, nursing home
spending grew by about 3.4% in states with poorly developed
HCBS programs, while spending on nursing homes declined by
15.3% in states that offered widespread access to HCBS.67
While studies have found that nursing home spending
remained stable for the years immediately following
implementation of comprehensive HCBS programs, it began to
decline in the fourth year following expansion and continued to
decline in every subsequent year.68 This suggests that as HCBS
programs become established and recognized within the
community, seniors begin to take advantage of cost-effective inhome care in order to avoid costly institutionalization in a
nursing home. It is, therefore, not surprising that states with
well-established HCBS programs are able to reduce their
overall spending on long-term care, given the extremely high
cost of nursing home care.
The three-year delay in recognizing cost savings on longterm care spending is to be expected, because while widely
accessible HCBS will delay or reduce admission into nursing
homes, it will not increase the rate at which seniors are
released from nursing homes.69 Because of this, states
experience the additional expenses associated with developing
and maintaining new HCBS programs and must still spend on
nursing home care for those seniors who reside in an
institutional setting when the HCBS programs become
available.70 While additional seniors may begin to take
advantage of HCBS services to decrease their reliance upon
unpaid, informal care provided by family members, seniors who
have already spent down their assets to qualify for Medicaid65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
See id.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 270-71.
See id.

15

BLOINK FINAL

2013]

2/28/2013 10:08 PM

PUTTING BOOMERS TO PASTURE

167

funded institutional care will remain in these nursing homes,
often for the remainder of their life expectancies. States will,
therefore, experience a lag in recognizing significant cost
savings until this overlap is diminished.71
By implementing the Olmstead integrated care mandate
and providing the Medicaid-eligible population with the choice
of in-home care, states eventually become able to reduce
spending on long-term care by decreasing the rate of admission
to nursing homes.72 The balance of this article assumes that if
the non-indigent Medicare-eligible population had funding
options similar to Medicaid-eligible seniors, they would,
analogously, choose to take greater advantages of HCBS
programs.
By using HCBS, these seniors would be admitted to
institutional care facilities less frequently, increasing the
period during which they are able to live free of Medicaid
support.73 Perhaps even more importantly, greater access to
HCBS will provide an incentive for seniors to engage their
financial advisors and plan for funding their own end-of-life
care in an effort to avoid institutionalization and remain in
their homes.
In light of the 2010 MIPPA defunding of the Medigap athome recovery option, encouraging seniors to plan and prepare
for financing their own in-home care is now more important
than ever. The advice of financial advisors and attorneys can be
invaluable to middle class retirees who may be planning to rely
on government funding for their end-of-life care. If avoiding
institutionalization is the goal for these retirees, planning to
privately fund HCBS must become a priority. Unfortunately,
many who are approaching retirement age lack the
professional guidance necessary to recognize this need and, as
such, remain financially unprepared to take advantage of the
HCBS options that would allow them to continue living
independently in their own homes while receiving long-term
care.
71. Id. at 271.
72. Id.
73. See Naoko Muramatsu et al., Risk of Nursing Home Admission
Among Older Americans: Does States’ Spending on Home- and CommunityBased Services Matter?, 62 J. GERONTOL SOC. SCI. S169, S171 (2007).
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V. Absence of Guidance
Many financial advisors and attorneys today have a
difficult time approaching their clients to discuss planning
strategies for funding end-of-life care, whether in an institution
or in the client’s own home. Planning for end-of-life care has
negative connotations for clients, who naturally recoil from
discussing the end of their lives. Because financial planners
and attorneys frequently fail to initiate the dialogue necessary
to develop a plan for financing end-of-life care, a substantial
gap in retirement planning has developed, leaving many
retirees unprepared to fund their own post-retirement medical
expenses. Frequently, the cadre of advisors employed by
today’s retirees simply has conflicting focuses that tend to
negate the importance of planning for end-of-life care.74 The
professional training and engrained focus of the respective
advisor groups leads to an embedded bias toward failing to
adequately consider the cost of this care.
Financial planners commonly focus on allocating a client’s
assets so as to provide sufficient retirement income to fund
post-retirement living expenses. Projecting end-of-life
unfunded health care expenses is more difficult, often because
the mobility of seniors today makes it challenging for an
advisor to determine the proper funding levels, as costs for
medical and long-term care vary widely from state to state. For
example, unfunded post-retirement health care costs
anticipated by a New Jersey resident are more than one-third
as high as those projected for a similarly situated senior citizen
living in Hawaii.75 The difficulty inherent in making an
74. See Joseph F. Coughlin & Lisa A. D’Ambrosio, Seven Myths of
Financial Planning and Baby Boomer Retirement, 14 J. FIN. SERVICES
MARKETING 83 (2009), (describing questions related to healthcare and longterm care as a new variety of questions facing financial professionals today);
Betty Meredith & John R. Salter, How Prepared Is the Retirement Industry
for Meeting the Needs of Retiring American Workers?, 17 FIN. SERVICES REV.
87 (2008) (identifying the traditional focus of retirement planning as wealth
accumulation and the need for financial advisors to focus more heavily on
post-retirement planning).
75. McGrath, supra note 26. HVS has developed a tool that allows
financial planners to input client data such as age, general level of health and
location in order to determine their estimated costs for end of life care. This
model projects that a seventy year old New Jersey resident will require
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accurate estimation of these post-retirement medical expenses
often results in financial planners altogether ignoring or
underestimating these expenses.76
Similarly, too often attorneys’ professional focus as they
advise new retirees is not primarily aimed at helping seniors
plan for financing end-of-life medical expenses. Trust and
estate attorneys primarily focus on the disposition of a client’s
assets post-mortem or on the tax issues surrounding a client’s
estate plan. If an attorney specializing in trusts and estates
does provide guidance on planning for post-retirement medical
care, the discussion is commonly limited to advice regarding
the execution of a durable health care power of attorney.77 A
durable health care power of attorney, while useful in some
circumstances, provides little opportunity for seniors to direct
the course of their own end-of-life care, as it instead serves to
delegate control over medical decisions to another in the event
that the senior becomes incapable of making his or her own
choices.78
Elder care attorneys are typically the only group of
attorney-advisors who commonly discuss end-of-life care
choices with their clients. Despite these conversations, it is
sometimes the case that when elder care attorneys advise their
clients, they may tend to tilt the discussion toward Medicaid
planning as a solution to the problem of financing end-of-life
care.79 Though this is not the only approach used to account for
end-of-life choices, it is one that is commonly employed. As a
policy matter, this approach is suspect because Medicaid
planning focuses on creating artificial indigence in order to
approximately $465,000 in today’s dollars to fund medical and long-term care
expenses of just over $1 million over his anticipated remaining lifespan. In
Florida, a similarly situated senior would require only $372,000 in today’s
dollars to fund roughly $785,000 in medical and long-term care expenses.
These variances can make it difficult for a financial planner to assist his or
her clients in planning for end of life care if they do not have access to a
comparable planning tool.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Maralee Buttery Vezie, Some Estate Planning
Fundamentals (With Forms), 42 PRAC. LAW. 67, 76 (1996).
78. See id. at 76-77.
79. See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, Medicaid Asset Planning by the Elderly: A
Policy View of Expectations, Entitlement and Inheritance, 4 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 1, 19 (1989).
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shift responsibility for financing end-of-life care to the
government.
At its core, Medicaid planning involves shifting a client’s
assets into trusts and other vehicles to create artificial
indigence so that the client will qualify for Medicaid benefits.80
Once a senior is indigent and qualifies for Medicaid benefits, he
or she becomes eligible for Medicaid-financed nursing home
care, which often eliminates access to many in-home care
options because in-home care, by definition, requires the senior
to fund an independent lifestyle. While Medicaid will cover the
personal care services that a senior may need, it will not fund
general living expenses that the senior will require to maintain
his or her home.
It is questionable whether this approach to end-of-life care
planning is the most effective or appropriate, in that it
encourages seniors to relinquish the responsibility for financing
their own post-retirement medical expenses. These seniors,
who in many circumstances are otherwise fully capable of
planning and paying for their own end-of-life care with the
proper guidance, are instead encouraged to rely on government
aid.
Though shifting these health care expenses to the state
obviously provides a quantifiable benefit to the client, who
becomes assured that the government will step in to fund his or
her end-of-life care, it is doubtful whether this provides the
most effective planning solution. By rendering themselves
artificially indigent in order to qualify for Medicaid, these
seniors relinquish control over their ability to access HCBS
because the course of their care defaults to the state guidelines
for Medicaid coverage. These state guidelines, as discussed
above, are biased toward the provision of long-term care in an
institutional setting, which is exactly what most seniors would
rather avoid.
Essentially, the mission of most advisors conflicts with the
need to assist clients in forming strategies to finance end-of-life
medical expenses. Allocating scarce assets to fund end-of-life
care arguably diverges from the primary mission of a financial
planner, which is to maximize retirement living expenses.
80. See generally id.
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Though many financial planners do attempt to account for
these unfunded medical expenses, the inherent difficulty in
accurately predicting the costs creates a bias toward
underestimating them in favor of allocating that postretirement cash flow to income. This tendency is also in accord
with the reality that many recent retirees will avoid
confronting the choice of whether to allocate funds to
retirement travel and entertainment versus using their hard
earned dollars to pay for home health aides.
Though retirees perhaps most commonly choose to consult
a trust and estate attorney at some point in their later years,
such attorneys’ focus is similarly diverted and centers upon
post-mortem disposition of their client’s debts and assets. Any
allocation of funds to end-of-life care expenses would deplete
the finite resources available for their clients to distribute after
death. Even if retirees do receive advice on paying for these
unfunded health costs, it is likely provided by an elder law
attorney advising them to shift the expenses to the state. In
adopting this approach, elder law attorneys are also
unwittingly shifting control over how this care will be provided
from the client to the Medicaid funding guidelines adopted by
their particular state.
This absence of guidance from financial advisors and
attorneys usually leaves seniors unprepared to direct or fund
their own end-of-life care. Clients nearing retirement age may
be wholly unaware that Medicare coverage of long-term care
expenses is extremely limited and that funding restrictions
often entirely eliminate home-based care as an option.81
Seniors lack guidance as to the complications and undesirable
financial aspects of Medicaid qualification, but this is often the
only option that remains for retirees who are financially
unprepared for long-term care expenses. Further, the void
created by this lack of guidance often leaves seniors
uninformed as to their choices for where their end-of-life care
will take place and unaware of options that do not involve
institutionalization.

81. Vincent Mor et al., The Revolving Door of Rehospitalization from
Skilled Nursing Facilities, 29 HEALTH AFF. 57 (2010).
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With proper planning and guidance, many seniors will be
able to take advantage of a wide range of intermediate care
options to avoid nursing home care, including adult daycare
programs and personal care services that can be provided in
the home. Seniors who have actively engaged in planning for
end-of-life expenses will find that institutionalization in a
nursing home is not the only avenue open to them. Remaining
in the home, which is a primary goal for most retirees,82 is
possible for seniors who are informed and prepared to control
their own end-of-life care.
VI. Initiating the Dialogue on End-of-Life Choices
The absence of guidance by financial advisors and
attorneys is a contributing factor to the lack of preparedness
among many seniors when it comes to funding post-retirement
medical expenses, but the unfortunate reality is that seniors
themselves help perpetuate this planning gap by largely
avoiding the conversation. There is a cognitive dissonance
among the aging baby boomer population, in that they wish to
retain control and independence,83 yet they often remain in
denial of the need to take the required steps to create the plans
necessary to remain in command of their end-of-life medical
care.84
This dichotomy is natural because, while baby boomers
crave financial independence and control, and want to ensure
that their children are provided for, they shy away from
discussions that focus upon the inevitable physical and mental
deterioration that could prevent them from achieving these
ideals. The remainder of this article will advance the theory
that the two halves of this dichotomy can work in conjunction

82. Barbara J. Edlund et al., Long-Term Care Planning for Baby
Boomers: Addressing an Uncertain Future, ONLINE J. ISSUES NURSING (May
31,
2003),
http://www.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/ANAMarketplace/ANAPe
riodicals/OJIN/TableofContents/Volume82003/No2May2003/CarePlanningfor
BabyBoomers.html.
83. Id.
84. Lois A. Vitt, Consumers’ Financial Decisions and the Psychology of
Values, J. FIN. SERVS. PROFESSIONALS, Nov. 2004, at 68, 69.
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in order to encourage seniors to engage in meaningful dialogue
with advisors to plan for financing end-of-life care. By
appealing to the sense of accountability and individualism that
is the hallmark of this generation,85 society can motivate the
baby boomer population to regain control over the fiscal choices
that will define their end-of-life medical care.
A. Imposing Filial Support Liability to Motivate Planning
Among Retiree-Clients
Today, twenty-nine states have filial support statutes on
their books under which financially capable adult children can
be held responsible for the unpaid medical bills of their
indigent parents, including nursing home bills.86 The statutes
are enforceable even against the children of elderly individuals
who have not planned for end-of-life care and become eligible to
rely upon Medicaid to fund long-term care expenses.87 Although
these statutes are rarely enforced and Medicaid continues to
fund most extended nursing home stays in the United States,
modern budgetary constraints caused by the rising costs of
nursing home care coupled with the economic recession that
began in 2008 have compelled nursing homes to examine
alternate funding methods.88 Rather than seek Medicaid
reimbursement, some nursing homes have sought enforcement
of these filial support statutes to collect payment for nursing
home care from the adult children of elderly nursing home
residents.89 As the baby boomer generation ages and imposes a
greater strain upon the Medicaid system, it is likely that more
nursing homes will begin to regularly seek enforcement of

85. See generally LEONARD STEINHORN, THE GREATER GENERATION: IN
DEFENSE OF THE BABY BOOM LEGACY (2006).
86. Katherine C. Pearson, Filial Support Laws in the Modern Era:
Domestic and International Comparison of Enforcement Practices for Laws
Requiring Adult Children to Support Indigent Parents, 20 ELDER L.J.
(forthcoming Fall 2012) (manuscript at 8) (on file with Penn. State eLibrary).
87. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4603(a)(1) (2005) (permitting enforcement
of the filial support law even if the indigent adult is a “public charge”); see,
e.g., Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am. v. Pittas, 2012 PA Super 96, 46 A.3d
719 (2012).
88. See Pearson, supra note 86.
89. Id.
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these statutes.
To illustrate, in May 2012, a Pennsylvania court required
that the adult child of an indigent nursing home resident pay
an unpaid nursing home bill of approximately $93,000.90 The
defendant’s mother had no choice but to leave nursing home
bills unpaid while her application for Medicaid, which was still
pending at trial, was being considered.91 The Pennsylvania
appellate court agreed with the trial court that the elderly
woman’s son was liable under the filial support statute
regardless of whether the Medicaid application was eventually
approved.92 This is because, under the Pennsylvania law, the
spouse, children, and parents of an indigent person have the
responsibility to “care for and maintain or financially assist
[that] indigent person, regardless of whether the indigent
person is a public charge.”93
Although the Pennsylvania statute provides an exception
for individuals who are financially unable to provide the legally
mandated assistance,94 this provision did not exempt the adult
child in Pittas who, while solvent, had an annual income of
approximately $85,000 and claimed his personal expenses
rendered him unable to satisfy the $93,000 debt.95
Filial responsibility was imposed in the Pittas case despite
the absence of fault on the part of the defendant96—but this has
not always been the norm. Though enforcement of the statute
has been rare, as mentioned above, in Presbyterian Medical
Center v. Budd,97 the Pennsylvania courts imposed filial
responsibility upon the adult daughter of an indigent woman
when the court found that the daughter had engaged in a type
of Medicaid planning that directly caused her mother’s
indigence.98 In this case, the daughter used her power of
attorney to transfer over $100,000 of her elderly mother’s

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Pittas, 2012 PA Super 96, 46 A.3d at 724.
Id. at 723.
See id. at 722.
23 PA. CONN. STAT. ANN. § 4603(a)(1) (emphasis added).
23 PA. CONN. STAT. ANN. § 4603(a)(2)(i).
Pittas, 2012 PA Super 96, 46 A.3d at 722-23.
Id.
2003 PA Super 323, 832 A.2d 1066.
See id. ¶ 28, 832 A.2d at 1077.
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assets into her own accounts in order to cause her mother to
qualify for Medicaid coverage.99 When the elderly woman’s
Medicaid application was denied, the nursing home attempted
to collect the unpaid bills under theories of breach of contract
and fraudulent transfer.100 Both arguments were rejected by
the court in its decision to rely solely upon the filial support
statute.101
While fault is not an element of Pennsylvania’s filial
support law, the court discussed the defendant’s improper
appropriation of her mother’s assets in analyzing the elements
of the statute.102 The court found that the defendant’s transfer
of over $100,000 to her personal accounts rendered her mother
indigent and the defendant financially capable in the same
transaction, thus allowing the court to impose liability.103
Pennsylvania is only one of twenty-nine states to maintain
a filial support statute, but the state’s rare enforcement of the
law is still much more frequent than in the twenty-eight other
states where enforcement is possible.104 This article does not
intend to suggest that imposition of filial liability is an
appropriate means to finance the end-of-life medical expenses
of seniors, though enforcement of the law in limited
circumstances would serve to raise awareness among the aging
baby boomer population. Widespread national media coverage
of the Pittas case has alerted many to the possibility that these
laws could be enforced,105 but enforcement is still viewed as a
fluke occurrence that is not likely to be repeated. Eliminating
the perception that these statutes are antiquated and unlikely
to be enforced through regular enforcement where, as in Budd,
some degree of fault can be demonstrated, could provide baby
boomers with the necessary deterrent to spur planning for endof-life care.

99. Id. ¶ 3, 832 A.2d at 1069.
100. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 832 A.2d at 1069.
101. Id. ¶ 29, 832 A.2d at 1077.
102. Id. ¶ 18, 832 A.2d at 1076.
103. Id.
104. See Pearson, supra note 86, at 17.
105. Id. at 21-22.
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By causing baby boomers to become alert to the possibility
that filial support obligations could be imposed upon their
children, society can appeal to the individualism and sense of
accountability that is characteristically found among members
of this generation.106 The idea of leaving large debts to their
children likely will have more immediacy and be more
disturbing to a boomer, in contrast to the more nebulous idea
that their generation may leave this burden to the entirety of
the next generation. To avoid the real possibility of imposing
liability upon their children, baby boomers may be more willing
to engage their advisors in a discussion about managing their
eventual physical and mental deterioration and the allocation
of resources necessary to effectively control the course of their
own end-of-life care.
Not only will selective enforcement of filial support
statutes encourage baby boomers to engage in meaningful
planning dialogue with their financial advisors, it could serve
as the germ of an empowering message of hope and control that
financial advisors and attorneys alike can share with their
aging clients. These clients’ general aversion to discussing endof-life decisions contributes enormously to the difficulty
experienced by advisors who wish to generate awareness of the
need to financially prepare for funding end-of-life care. By
focusing on the need for seniors to take responsibility for their
own future liabilities, financial advisors can impart a message
of hope and possibility to their clients, rather than
discouraging and alienating these clients through forced
discussion of their future infirmities.
B. Changing the Content of the Planning Dialogue
Because seniors value the ability to maintain autonomy
and control in the final years of their lives so greatly, the
abhorrent prospect of institutionalization tends to mask the
vision of hope and possibility that can be found in the longterm care planning landscape. Instead of focusing on the
negative aspects of long-term care late in life, advisors can
pitch proper planning to their clients as an opportunity to
106. See generally STEINHORN, supra note 85.
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ensure that they maintain the greatest possible degree of
control over their care.
While it is impossible to plan for or predict every scenario,
fulsome end-of-life planning can ensure that the course of a
senior’s care most closely resembles that which he or she
chooses to design. Seniors who are reluctant to leave the
financial liability for long-term care expenses to their children
will be equally unwilling to allow these children to become
solely responsible for the burden of making the decisions
regarding the course of their care.
As discussed above, the adult children of seniors are very
likely to end up providing some level of informal in-home care
for their parents.107 These adult children may have motives
that conflict with the end-of-life choices preferred by their
parents, in that they might not have the time or resources to
provide the in-home care needed by their elderly parents.108
The lost opportunity costs and lack of training in effective care
giving, outlined in Part II,109 means that these adult children
will eventually become unable to continue providing informal
care and, in many cases, will be forced to resort to
institutionalizing their elderly parents in nursing homes.
Seniors can avoid this result with proper financial
planning for professional in-home care. When seniors have the
funds necessary to finance their own care, there is often no
need for adult children to forego wages or their own familial
responsibilities to provide their parents with informal care.
This allows seniors to retain the control and autonomy they
desire instead of relinquishing independence by transferring
responsibility to adult children with potentially conflicting
motivations.
Translating awareness of the need to plan for end-of-life
care into an empowering and hopeful message for seniors will
change the way retirees look at end-of-life planning. By
structuring the dialogue as a way to plan for retaining
autonomy and control late in life, advisors can help seniors
recognize end-of-life planning as a path toward avoiding the

107. See Byrne et al., supra note 30, at 1205.
108. Id. at 1232.
109. See supra Part II.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/4

26

BLOINK FINAL

178

2/28/2013 10:08 PM

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1

institutionalization that they dread. Allocating sufficient
resources toward end-of-life expenses can allow these seniors to
take advantage of the home and community based health and
personal care services available outside of the Medicaidfinanced path. Though HCBS allows seniors to maintain ties
with their families and social networks, with proper planning
these families and social networks will not be obligated to
become the HCBS program.
C. The Professional Duty to Begin the Dialogue on End-of-Life
Choices
Advisors also have a professional responsibility, and
perhaps even a legal duty, to engage their clients in these
planning discussions.110 Lawsuits against advisors who have
improperly omitted end-of-life planning strategies from a
client’s overall financial plan are uncommon today. However,
the increasing costs of health care coupled with the possibility
of more stringently enforced filial support laws indicate that
this liability may become much more common in the future.
Attorneys, who undeniably act as fiduciaries, have a
professional responsibility to advise their clients of the need for
long-term care planning as a corollary to estate or Medicaid
planning.111 Financial planners may similarly be held liable for
failing to properly advise their clients with regard to long-term
care planning as the scope of fiduciary liability continues to
expand.112 While most cases imposing liability upon financial
advisors under fiduciary liability theories involve improper
investment advice surrounding annuity sales or investment
strategy,113 the classification of a financial advisor as a
fiduciary in any context is significant because of its

110. Robert D. Hayes et al., What Attorneys Should Know About LongTerm Care Insurance, 7 ELDER L.J. 1, 3 (1999).
111. See id.
112. See W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. v. Graben, 233 S.W.3d 360, 37374 (2007) (finding a relationship of trust and confidence existed to support a
fiduciary relationship between the financial advisor and client).
113. See Sally Balch Hurme, Who’s in the Batter’s Box?: Regulating and
Litigating Unsuitable Sales of Variable Annuities, 1 PHOENIX. L. REV. 365,
423 (2008).
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precedential value.
Broker-dealers and investment advisors have been
categorized as fiduciaries in certain circumstances, depending
upon the degree of trust and confidence that the client places in
her advisor.114 Where a fiduciary duty is found to exist, the
advisor has a “heightened duty” to act on the client’s behalf.115
The client in the fiduciary relationship can, in some instances,
bring an individual cause of action against a fiduciary who
breaches this duty by failing to give proper advice.116 When
financial advisors and attorneys acting in a fiduciary capacity
ignore the need to plan for clients’ unfunded end-of-life care
expenses, they invite potential lawsuits from these clients
alleging that failure to provide such planning advice
constitutes a breach of their fiduciary obligations. This is
because the analogy between imposing fiduciary liability for
improper investment advice, and imposing this liability for
failing to advise on a planning issue as critical as planning for
long-term care, could easily be accepted in court.

114. See ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 11 (2008), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR556.html.
115. See generally Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of BrokerDealers and Investment Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 719-29 (2010). While
investment advisors are classified as fiduciaries under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 191 (1963), broker-dealers are only considered to act in a fiduciary
capacity in limited circumstances. See Laby, supra note 115, at 719-29.
Broker-dealers are often able to take advantage of an exception in the
Investment Advisers Act because they commonly provide investment advice
only as an incidental aspect of their duties. George Steven Swan, The Law
and Economics of Interprofessional Frontier Skirmishing: Financial Planning
Association v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 16 U. MIAMI BUS. L.
REV. 75, 106 (2007). However, broker-dealers who have investment discretion
over client accounts, or who provide more than incidental investment advice,
will often be held to a fiduciary standard. Laby, supra note 115, at 704-05,
715. Broker-dealers act in several capacities, one of which is the “broker”
capacity in which part of their role involves buying and selling on behalf of
their clients, rather than simply trading securities with their own customers.
See id. at 2-3. Broker-dealers who act in a “broker” capacity act as agents for
their clients and are, therefore, more likely to be held to the higher fiduciary
standard. See generally Thomas Lee Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker
Standards Sufficient? Principles, Rules and Fiduciary Duties, 2010 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 710 (2010).
116. See Hurme, supra note 113.
ON
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In Western Reserve Life Assurance, for example, a Texas
court found that an advisor had a fiduciary duty to provide
appropriate investment advice to his clients and that he
breached this duty.117 The plaintiffs in Western Reserve were
relatively unsophisticated investors who testified that they
relied heavily upon the advice of the defendant in their
financial planning.118 While the plaintiffs had broadly
described their financial goals, they placed substantial trust in
the appropriateness of the defendant’s investment advice.119
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that no
fiduciary relationship could be found because the activities
between the parties constituted arm’s-length business
transactions.120 In its holding, the court stressed the
importance of the advisor’s role in finding that he “acted as a
financial advisor whom the [c]lients trusted to monitor the
performance of their investments and recommend appropriate
financial plans to them.”121 According to the court, when the
defendant assumed the role of investment advisor, managing
and monitoring his client’s investments, he himself caused the
relationship to elevate to a fiduciary level.122
Though the financial plans in Western Reserve were not
related specifically to funding post-retirement medical
expenses, the reasoning could easily be expanded to apply to
advisors neglecting to plan for end-of-life care. Therefore, by
failing to recommend that clients plan for financing end-of-life
care, advisors expose themselves to the potential expansion of
this line of reasoning to include failure to provide advice with
regard to unfunded post-retirement health care expenses. This
possibility of exposure to professional and legal liability for
failing to properly advise clients in planning to fund end-of-life
care provides a compelling argument that will motivate
advisors to engage in comprehensive planning discussions with
their clients. If the deterrent effect of selectively enforcing filial
support statutes becomes effective, seniors themselves will be
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

W. Reserve Life Assurance Co., 233 S.W.3d at 374.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 374.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
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equally motivated by the fear that they will burden their
children by failing to properly account for the cost of their endof-life care.
D. Dual Motivation for Crafting a Comprehensive End-of-Life
Care Plan
These dual deterrent motivators, working in conjunction,
will serve to force the dialogue between advisors and seniors,
even if the discussion begins by focusing only on a “necessary
evil” that must be addressed. Discussion of the “evils” inherent
in failing to plan for end-of-life care can provide enough of a
spark to ignite the fuller planning dialogue.
Convincing aging clients that planning for end-of-life care
is “the right thing to do” is only a starting point for providing
seniors with the tools necessary to direct the course of their
future long-term care. Advisors who are motivated by fear of
professional liability can initiate an empowering discussion
that emphasizes the paradigms of familial and fiscal
responsibility among their baby boomer clients, and, in the
process, may remove some of the stigma attached to end-of-life
planning. Through more in-depth discussion of long-term care
planning, advisors can help seniors avoid not only the financial
burden they could leave to their children, but also the
emotional burden imposed when children are forced to
determine the course of their parents’ end-of-life care, after the
seniors themselves can no longer make the relevant decisions.
Raising the long-term care issue itself is necessary, but it
is not a sufficient solution to the problem, which can only be
solved through a dialogue in which both advisor and client are
invested in creating a comprehensive plan. A fulsome
discussion of end-of-life planning opens the door for advisors to
move beyond solutions involving insurance and financing, to
the use of detailed living wills and advanced directives to help
seniors control the course of their own care late in life. Opening
the door to the consideration of financial burdens will not only
allow seniors to avoid indigence late in life, but can lead to
development of this all-encompassing, comprehensive end-oflife plan that will leave seniors feeling prepared and in control
of their future care.
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Conclusion

Since Medigap’s at-home recovery option was defunded,
Medicare-eligible seniors have been largely unable to access
HCBS programs, leaving them with little choice but to receive
long-term care in nursing homes. The post-Olmstead Medicaid
experience has illustrated the ability of states to reduce
institutional expenses by developing and implementing
comprehensive HCBS programs. In a post-MIPPA world, the
next logical step is increasing access to HCBS among the nonindigent senior population by helping them create financial
plans that would allow these seniors to access HCBS without
government assistance.
Despite advancing HCBS programs, attorneys and
financial planners currently have little incentive to initiate a
conversation with clients about planning for end-of-life care
and making use of HCBS. This lack of motivation, coupled with
client’s reluctance to discuss end-of-life care, has led to a
planning gap among retirees that leaves many unprepared to
fund their own end-of-life care. Selective enforcement of filial
support statutes in cases where some degree of fault can be
demonstrated can motivate baby boomer clients to engage their
advisors in a planning dialogue to avoid leaving the debt for
end-of-life care to their children.
Further, increasing the awareness of advisors’ professional
duty to engage in this planning dialogue, as well as the
possibility of fiduciary liability for failing to do so, can provide
motivation for these advisors to initiate the conversation.
These dual motivators can work together to create an
environment in which end-of-life planning discussions can be
empowering and positive as advisors and clients work together
to develop comprehensive plans for end-of-life care. Forcing
this dialogue to the surface can provide baby boomer retirees
the independence and control they crave and allow them to
make responsible choices about their end-of-life care plans.
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